The publication in 1900 of Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations (second edition 1913 , third edition 1920 ) exerted a profound influence in a number of academic disciplines during the period 1900 to 1915 and just after the First World War. Recent studies have demonstrated the impact of Husserl's project on the inception of the structural model in linguistics and the categorization of perceptual structures in Gestalt Psychology. The present study looks closely at the articulation of a novel theory of individual psychological development proposed in several later works by Lev Vygotsky (1896 -1934 , one of the great pioneer Soviet psychologists. Vygotsky attempted to demonstrate that the development of human cognition could best be explained through the dynamic interaction of two processes: the internalization of external particulars and the deployment of symbolic statements through 'inner speech'. In addition to a language of thought, humans have a language for thought, and this is a cognitive and behavioural control language. In offering a socio-cultural account of the construction of an inner private world (the self), Vygotsky struck off on a 'third way' which he thought avoided the pitfalls of both an overly naturalistic, objectivist explanation of observable behaviour, for example, in Soviet conditioned reflex studies; and an introspective, subjectivist description of mental acts, an approach which he identified with certain motivations within philosophical idealism. In his chapter on 'The Current Crisis in Psychology', he quite clearly relegates Husserl's phenomenology to the latter approach and criticizes Husserl's theory of meaning in language for lacking a genetic or dynamic dimension. However, it is our contention that Vygotsky both misrepresents the phenomenological analysis of meaning-formation and appropriates basic Husserlian conceptual terms in his elaboration of 'the inner form of the word'.
Investigation is, 'for all its inadequacies, the single most important contribution to realist (Aristotelian) ontology in the modern period' (Smith, 1982: 37) .
HUSSERL'S THEORY OF PARTS AND WHOLES
In the Third Investigation, Husserl introduces two pairs of terms: part and whole, dependent and independent -it is the permutations of these terms which endow the theory with such powerful logical scope. Every intentional 'object', i.e. every thing considered as the 'content' of a cognitive act, can be related to another as part to whole, whole to part, or as parts of one whole. It is the way in which parts are related to parts or in which parts compose wholes that reveals whether they are dependent or independent. An independent whole is a complex 'object', i.e. divisible into parts, which can exist alone in that it does not require the existence of any other 'object'. A dependent whole is also a complex 'object' insofar as it is divisible into parts, but cannot exist alone; it requires some greater whole of which it is a part. An independent part (piece) is an 'object' or content of thought which makes up a whole or other complex 'object', which qua part can stand on its own, e.g. the handle of a teacup. A dependent part (moment) is an 'object' which makes up a whole or other complex 'object', but which cannot stand on its own, e.g. the teacup's colour or shape. With regard to material things whose wholes are concrete, parts and wholes are said to stand or exist on their own (or not) as the 'objects' of cognition; one should say perhaps that they can (or cannot) be made the content of presentations.
The great power and scope of this schema, which has inspired so many later workers in the field, lies in Husserl's essential insight into the purely formal a priori character of the relations which hold between any sort of part and any sort of whole. These a priori regularities have such heuristic scope due to the critical distinction between dependence and independence, a distinction grounded in the definition of foundation. Throughout his discussion, Husserl takes the term 'object' in the widest possible sense (too wide, in fact, for some critics) to include both transcendent objects in the natural world and the intentional 'objects' which are present to consciousness -the latter are the proper domain of phenomenological enquiry. The term 'content' has sometimes been used to refer to the 'object' of an intentional experience, but Husserl rarely uses the word in that sense. The content of an intentional act includes only what is in the act that makes that act the intentional experience that it is; 'the object is properly speaking nothing at all in an idea'. The content of an act is always something distinct from the act's object, but within the act itself there are different components or moments that the term 'content' can adequately pick out -the two principal 'sides' of the content are its 'quality' and its 'matter'. There are also different kinds of content, which correspond to different senses of what it means for contents to be in consciousness -they can be 'real' (reell ) or 'ideal' (ideal ) content. The 'quality' of an intentional act is that part of an act's content which differentiates the act according to its kind. The 'matter' of an intentional act is that part of an act's content that determines which object is intended in the act and how the object is intended, i.e. what the 'object' is intended as. In contrast to the 'real' content, the intentional content of an act is an 'ideal' or abstract entity that can take place in various conscious acts; whereas the 'real' content of an act is unique to that specific act alone. Despite some changes in Husserl's views between 1900 and 1913 , he remains consistent regarding one consequence of this intentional analysis which is crucial for our understanding of Vygotsky -the intentional content of a cognitive act is a meaning (Bedeutung) or sense (Sinn).
The psychical act which presents a concrete 'object', e.g. the appearing apple, is immediate and independent since it does not need, i.e. require foundation in, any other presentations. Whereas the act which apprehends an abstract content, e.g. redness or roundness, is mediate and dependent since it does require the presentation of a concrete 'object'. Concrete 'objects' can be either wholes, which one thinks of as individual, self-subsistent things, or parts of wholes; as such, independent concrete parts are called 'pieces'. Abstract contents are not thought of as individuals which can exist on their own, though through the process of ideation they can be thought of in terms of universals which are instanced in specific 'objects'; as dependent parts they are called 'moments'. The skin, seeds, pulp, etc., of an apple are pieces of the whole apple, that is, parts in the sense that the whole apple requires their presence, but independent in the sense that they can exist apart from the whole; though of course that apple no longer exists when so pieced. On the other hand, the redness and roundness of the apple are moments of the whole, since being red and being round as such cannot exist without something whose colour and shape they are. This does not imply that they cannot be thought of separately, since of course the concepts redness or roundness can be conceived apart from any red or round 'object'. Let it also be noted that a piece of that whole apple, whether just the skin or a segment, can also have both pieces and moments.
Husserl's concern is not merely with simple and complex concrete things, for the formal character of the theory and its a priori laws of essence mean that such ordered structural relations, as outlined above, hold also within other cognitive domains and higher-order objectivities. These latter comprise, for example, the perceptual field of consciousness, mathematical and geometrical constructions, propositional meanings, complex highly organized individuals (human beings), classes of individuals, and masses or collectives of non-individuals (or 'dividuals', to borrow Jonathan Lowe's term).
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The fact that an apple always appears within a field of other co-perceived objects, and stands out due to the advertence of attention, also indicates a relation of essential dependence between the whole apple and the whole perceptual field. It also indicates that a group of apples (or, more clearly, a group of dots) organized in a specific manner, though entirely separate from each other, will always be perceived as forming a determinate figural shape or Gestalt; and thus that the Gestalt is dependent on a certain ordered relation between all of its constituent moments.
Of great interest here is the recension of linguistic meaning in light of these formal features: these 'yield the necessary foundation for the essential categories of meaning on which . . . a large number of a priori laws of meaning rest. . . . These laws, which govern the sphere of complex meanings, and whose role it is to divide sense from nonsense, are not yet the so-called laws of logic in the pregnant sense of this term: they provide pure logic with the possible meaning forms' (Husserl, 1970: 493) . Husserl then goes on to distinguish the expression of a statement as composed of sensuous (audible) parts from its meaning. An investigation of the former is a matter for descriptive psycho-physiology (later codified in phonology), but he does hint at some key aspects of the sensuous manifestation of language: stressed versus unstressed contents and the manner in which such contents are blended (ibid.: 450-3). Meaning, however, only pertains to an expression in virtue of the mental acts which give it sense. It would be incorrect to think that Husserl wants to reduce meaning to the mental acts which find their 'voice' in the speaker's utterance. For he does mark the crucial dichotomy between what an expression intimates, i.e. what it indicates about the speaker's mental and emotional states, and the 'objectivity' to which the statement refers by way of its meaning.
A statement is composed of parts, bound together by syntactical rules, which can be either independently or dependently meaningful. Singular terms and complete sentences, the linguistic substrate for the statement, are independently meaningful, that is, a singular term can 'constitute the full, entire meaning of a concrete act of meaning'. Other kinds of parts, however, e.g. connectives, prepositions, adverbs, etc., are only dependently meaningful, since they require other terms to complete a content which can be made the 'object' of a presentation. The a priori laws which govern the combination of independent and dependent contents partially determine the sense (or nonsense) of the whole statement of which they are parts, insofar as these laws are in accord with the given syntax of the language. But they cannot of themselves determine the validity or absurdity of such lawfully formed combinations. Thus the statement 'That thing is a round square' is syntactically correct, i.e. it has not violated any of the rules for sentence formation, and yet it cannot be made the meaningful content of a presentation. Because intentionality as such is composed of both the mental act and its content, an intuition of the content as such-and-such can be compatible with another content only insofar as these intuitions are in accord with purely formal logical laws.
An intuition, as the fulfilled content of an intention which grasps the 'object' precisely in the manner in which it is given can be directed not only toward the concrete, singular 'object' -whether in perception, phantasy or memory -but also toward abstract, universal 'objects' which function as species for which particulars are either individuals (independent components) or moments (dependent components). It is in terms of universal propositions that Husserl formulates a priori laws pertaining to the conjoining of such contents in either a necessary or a contingent connection. An analytic proposition is one whose truth is completely independent of the specific content of their 'objects' and of any possible existential assertion. A synthetic proposition, on the other hand, is one whose truth is indeed dependent on the specific contents of their 'objects', which may be necessarily connected, but which also may be empirical specifications, i.e. with factual delineations. This is by no means a complete survey of part-whole relations in the realm of propositional meaning, but a broad overview of the main constituent features. David Bell comments after his critical survey of the principles of partwhole theory: 'What, as it were, breathes life into this situation are the mental acts, and in particular the moments of those acts called their act-matters, which are the source of all intentionality' (Bell, 1990: 141) . This is a poignant and thought-provoking statement, especially in light of the animating (not to be confused with animistic) aspect of cognitive acts as disclosed in the pretheoretical sphere of the 'naïve' standpoint. However, it is not our purpose to trace the complex reticulations of parts and wholes through various topical analyses, or to explore the more recent research into a well-developed, mature part-whole theory (see Simons, 1987: 162-71) . In order to make sense of the complex issue of Vygotsky's exploitation of phenomenological terms we need to carefully lay out the original Husserlian templates.
HUSSERL'S THESIS ABOUT THE NAIVE STANDPOINT
Husserl's other influential work from these early years, 'Philosophy as Rigorous Science', was first published in the first volume of the journal Logos for 1910-11. Here Husserl continues and expands his criticisms of empirical psychology from the 'Prolegomena', but with more explicit attention to the programmatic claims made by fact-based psychological theories to emulate the axiomatic character of lawful regularities in the natural sciences. The world investigated by the natural sciences is fully open to the observation and abstraction of determinations of necessary relations between objects and HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 13 (3) 74 events, irrespective of the symbolic or mediated framework in which such relations are expressed. But in the conscious domain, i.e. the world as investigated by the psychological 'detective', all 'objects' of enquiry are such as are given to consciousness before they are 'subject to' the fixation of terms in a methodology. It is the very essence of psychical phenomena that they are always mediated, always-already given as expressed in some form or other, which are 'fluid and ambiguous' until they are made determinate by the terms of a psychological schema. 'In its purely psychological concepts, which it now cannot at all dispense with, it necessarily gives a content that is not simply taken from what is actually given in experience, but is applied to the latter' (Husserl, 1981: 177) .
The genuine phenomenological method directs the investigator to focus on precisely that naïve experience of the psychical, as the natural scientist does with the naïve data of the physical world, but then to leave it alone, to pay attention to exactly the way in which naïveté is manifest in all that which appears to consciousness. The pre-theoretical, 'unscientific' fact that 'objects' are given sometimes as vague, unclear or even deceptive, before scientific mentality 'corrects' these appearances, is itself extremely important and indicative of the unique 'nature' of the psychical domain. 'To follow the model of the natural sciences almost inevitably means to reify consciousness -something that from the beginning leads us into absurdity.' Physical realities exist in a unified spatio-temporal world, a world with one space and one time, within which these realities are or are not causally connected. Each physical thing has its own nature as point (or juncture) within all of one nature, subject to causal laws; in fact, it is often the case that a physical thing is only identifiable with respect to those laws, e.g. sub-atomic particles. In contrast, psychical 'realities' are given as unities of immediate experience, of diverse sensible changes, each of which may be given originarily as an 'object' within its own spatio-temporal field, that is, as co-determined only by all those other 'objects' which appear with it. Stabilities, changes and the relations between changes within the phenomenal field function for cognition 'like a vague medium', through which the 'objective', physical nature shines forth (phainomena) and according to which scientific thought elicits and constructs general statements.
It is this 'vague medium' of the phenomenal world which is the proper domain of a strictly phenomenological investigation. Uncovering the constitution of 'objects' in consciousness, the purely formal relations of parts and wholes, the a priori laws governing different cognitive modalities, and so forth, are the almost exclusive concern of the transcendental phenomenology which Husserl undertakes throughout his many writings. However, this vague medium itself, with its instabilities, occlusions, deceptions and so forth, where 'objects' and relations are always only given within a self-founding perceptual field, is the proper domain of a concrete science. Concrete in that PHENOMENOLOGICAL FACTORS 75 this study makes available pre-theoretical apprehensions of 'objects' and their relations, and pre-predicative judgements based on them. Any psychology (or social science) which pays strict attention to this concrete, sensuous world has all the greater chance of allowing the 'objective' nature of the phenomena described to 'shine through'. Any so-called 'scientific' psychology which already interprets the data, which conflates that which is given in the psychical dimension with that to which it is applied, will always only allow its own naturalistic model of the 'objective' to shine through. This last insightful reflection is very close to Vygotsky's summary critique, in 'The Crisis in Current Psychology', of the dominant Soviet approach to explanation of psychological development in terms of categories of behaviour reaction. (Smith, 1982 (Smith, , 1988 . The other outstanding Husserlian presence during Vygotsky's years of intense theoretical and experimental research was through the teaching of Gustav Shpet, who had been a student of Husserl at Göttingen before the war and was Vygotsky's teacher at Moscow University in the early 1920s. In February 1914, Shpet wrote to Husserl that, 'Phenomenology stirs up a strong and serious interest in all philosophical circles here. . . . I am defending the HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 13 (3) 76 ideas of phenomenology in my lectures and classroom exercises, and have already had the opportunity of speaking twice in public. The opinion of phenomenology everywhere is high and positive; phenomenology is considered as the first and new step of philosophy' (Holenstein, 1975: 62 Shpet, 1991 ). Shpet's seminars and lectures in the Moscow Linguistic Circle had a profound impact on researchers and postgraduate students, bringing them into lively contact with an ardent phenomenologist. Shpet endorsed Husserl's vehement rejection of empirical psychology, according to one recent study, and 'insisted on the inadequacy of the genetic and individual explanations of language. Language is a social given, an object sui generis, to be investigated and described according to its immanent structural laws' (Cassedy, 1997) . By the time that Vygotsky attended Shpet's seminars, Shpet's own reflections on these issues had been considerably enriched and transformed. Cassedy remarks that Shpet's modifications of Husserl's transcendental idealism result in a philosophical orientation that combines phenomenological analysis of the structures of consciousness with the fundamental Platonism of Russian orthodoxy, the doctrine of Christ's incarnation, and the strange notion that matter should be venerated. An even more direct influence which Shpet may have exercised on Vygotsky's thinking, especially regarding the plane of 'inner speech' (discussed below), was through Shpet's seminar on von Humboldt's doctrine of the 'inner form of the word' 1 (for which, see Haardt, 1992: 120-30) . Gustav Shpet's seminars were not the only source of contact with Husserl's thought for the young Vygotsky during and after his university years. When Vygotsky, Luria and Leontev were invited to join the Psychological Institute in Moscow by its director Kornilov, they had already been witnesses to the divestiture of its previous director Chelpanov. Giorgi Chelpanov started teaching at Moscow University in the Faculty of Philosophy in 1907 and founded the Psychological Institute in 1912, with the later usurper Kornilov as one of his assistants. It was Chelpanov who organized and conducted seminars in 1915-16 on Husserl's phenomenology and Koffka's Analysis of Ideas and their Laws, a work in which its author explicitly and repeatedly commends Husserl's instructive insights. Jakobson, himself an advanced student at that time, remarked that 'the debates in [Chelpanov's] seminars moved on a high level; impassioned psychologists and tempestuous Husserlians were equally welcome participants here' (Holenstein, 1975: 63) 2 Their understanding of phenomenology is quite thin, limited to a crude notion of an unfiltered firstperson account of subjective experience. They also consistently fail to discriminate between competing schemes of part-whole relations, and dependence and independence, which were interpreted with subtle and farranging consequences by the various Gestalt psychologists.
To return to our principal story, in November 1935, Husserl gave a lecture to the Prague Linguistic Circle on the intersubjective constitution of language. 3 Jakobson had already presented Husserl with his own paper, 'Folklore as a Special Form of Creation', and Holenstein speculates that this paper may have stimulated Husserl's own thoughts, since Jakobson's essay bears on the same topics as Husserl's later 'The Origins of Geometry', composed in 1936 and published as an appendix to The Crisis of European Sciences. This was not the only direct point of contact with the new anthropology's study of folklore and 'primitive' mentality. In a letter of March 1935, Husserl credited the French social anthropologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl with having anticipated his own conception of the horizons of the life-world, and thus shown the way for a genuine science of social and cultural forms 4 (Spiegelberg, 1975: 78ff.) . Jakobson's years in Moscow and Prague were filled with an amazing diversity of interests and he had close contacts with writers and artists, such as Mayakovsky, Mandelstam, Pasternak, Seifert and Louis Aragon; these characters were also well known to Vygotsky. The Russian formalists and literary theorists were fascinated with avant-garde experiments in painting, especially cubism with its emphasis on the more formal, structural relations in the visual medium, an emphasis placed on the interplay of signs and not merely static objects. 'Essential traits of Prague structuralism are clearly anchored in Russian formalism, e.g. ideas adopted from cubism and futurism, which resulted in the concept of a dynamic interrelation of different perspectives and aspects and in the thesis of the creativity of language' (Holenstein, 1976: 9) . Jakobson was fond of quoting Braque's remark: 'I do not believe in things, I believe only in their relations.' He also referred to Picasso's stated desire that, in order to enliven the inward and outward relations to the visible sign, one had 'to break, to make one's revolution and start at zero'. A brief précis of the cubists' approach might make this parallel more apparent. By 1910, Picasso had become completely dissatisfied with the standard painterly conception of visual perspective (Golding, 1988: 73-80) . He wanted to achieve something of the roundness and volume of sculpture, in which the viewer can perceive different aspects of the object by moving around it. Braque spoke of the 'tangible spaces' between different possible perspectives in three-dimensional objects. In this cubist phase, they attempted to HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 13 (3) 78 pictorially convey the simultaneity of nuanced aspects within the twodimensional space of the canvas. This, in fact, is the artistic parallel of the phenomenological notion that physical 'objects' are given to consciousness with one prominent aspect, but where all the other aspects are co-given as possible fulfillments (or frustrations) of the intended whole. La Demoiselle d'Avignon demonstrates in a sensuous, even startling manner the meticulous excavations, carried out by Husserl in his 1907 lectures on Thing and Space, of the many layers of kinaesthetic syntheses of objects in the spatial manifold.
At about the time that Jakobson left Moscow for St Petersburg, Lev Vygotsky arrived at Moscow University where he studied a wide range of disciplines: linguistics, psychology, philosophy and the arts. For the next four or five years he wrote a large number of literary and theatrical reviews and collected material for his first published book, The Psychology of Art. He would undoubtedly have been aware of the poet Osip Mandelstam, whose celebrity status was at its zenith in the years just before his arrest and exile to the Gulag in 1927. In addition to his poetry collections, Mandelstam also published The Noise of Time (1925) and other essays which presented his theory of the production of poetic speech whose ineliminable source was the poet's own moving lips while he 'spoke' the poem to himself. An even more obvious influence on Vygotsky's later concept of the internalization of external particulars in the constitution of the psyche was Mikhail Bakhtin's critically acclaimed Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (1929) . Bakhtin argued here and elsewhere that words cannot be conceived apart from the voice which speaks them, and thus every word raises the question of authority. 'In his remarkable descriptions of the transitions from "social intercourse" to "outer speech" and from "outer speech" to "inner speech" and to consciousness, Bakhtin fundamentally rethinks both the relation of consciousness to the world around it and the relation of the self to others.' From this critique of the Freudian notion of an autonomous ego, he moves on to consider a poet's style, which is 'engendered from the style of his inner speech, which does not lend itself to control, and his inner speech is itself the product of his entire social life. . . . The role of the word [is] the semiotic material of inner life -consciousness (inner speech)' (Emerson, 1996: 127) .
Taking him away from an enthusiastic engagement with these new Russian artists and writers, he went to work for the newly reformed Institute of Psychology in Moscow where his teaching and prolific research with A. R. Luria and Leontev became the focus of a radical reorientation in psychology. Although he was only 38 at his death in 1934, his colleagues and students carried on his work in the Soviet Union, though they were often forced to keep a low profile under Stalin's regime. It is only during the last 20 years that western scholars have begun to appreciate the far-reaching and radical nature of his theoretical insights. He has been called, perhaps with some PHENOMENOLOGICAL FACTORS 79 justification, the Wittgenstein of 20th-century psychology, a genius who threw off all academic conventions, who single-mindedly blazed his own trail and left behind a host of note-taking interpreters. That is, of course, part of the Vygotsky legend and downplays both the influence of Husserl and William James and the equally important work of his colleagues. However, it is not one of the tasks of this article to adjudicate the many conflicting claims to priority and originality in his work. There were, however, three pivotal paradigm changes from which Vygotsky drew inspiration: Gestalt Psychology; Lévy-Bruhl's theory of primitive mentality; and Jean Piaget's recent work in child psychology. Husserl's phenomenology had exerted an enormous influence on the inception of Gestalt Psychology and on the theory of primitive mentality in Lévy-Bruhl, and hence mediately on his own conception of cognitive development. Piaget himself applauded Husserl's principled campaign against empirical psychology's explanation of logical laws and, early in his own career, clearly recognized Husserl's influence on Gestalt Psychology (Piaget, 1971: 102-15) .
The literary figures of Mandelstam and Bakhtin, the philosophical provocation of Shpet's seminars on 'the inner form of the word' and Chelpanov's seminars on phenomenology, and the theoretical stimulation of psychological insights from Koffka, Kohler, Lévy-Bruhl and Piaget are some of the identifiable coordinates in the complex framework within which Vygotsky elaborated his distinctive new vision of a scientific psychology. Vygotsky was a highly eclectic scholar of the history of psychological theory and its various philosophical underpinnings; he often made hasty diagnoses of theoretical problems and impasses, moving quickly forward to a new level of analysis, always concerned that a truly fruitful psychological theory was one that would allow for individual and collective transformation. It is simply not feasible, within the confines of this one article, to trace the complex reticulations of 'forward and backward glancing reinterpretations' (in Husserl's phrase) which inspired Vygostky to take up one theme, rather than another, and reshape it to his own ends. Rather, our attention will be focused on one clearly defined intellectual influence, Husserl's project for a pure phenomenology, though the manner in which this influence makes its intermittent appearance in Vygostky's writings cannot itself be clearly specified. One perhaps might think of Paul Ricoeur's comment on Husserl's use of Descartes' writings; though Husserl may have misunderstood or misappropriated Descartes' original insights and doctrines, he shaped such exceptional new insights from the Cartesian point of departure, that Descartes' legacy is all the richer for it.
HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 13(3) 80 VYGOTSKY'S DEPLOYMENT OF HUSSERLIAN CONCEPTS AND ARGUMENTS
The ontogenetic development of the forms of cognition is taken up at greater length by Vygotsky in Thinking and Speech (1934) , perhaps better known under its previous English title, Thought and Language. The first chapter, 'The Problem and Method of Investigation', shows the most obvious influence of Husserl's part-whole theory and Gestalt Psychological analysis of perceptual content; it shows up again in the last chapter where he articulates a complex dynamic regarding the internalization of external particulars and the completion of thought in the word. He opens his critique in the first chapter by denouncing psychological theories which divorce thinking from speech in order to study each system separately. He is quite adamant that only an understanding of thinking and speech as features of a unified whole will yield an adequate and fruitful psychological theory. He applauds recent research in structural linguistics for recognizing the distinction between dependent and independent parts of a whole, and demands that the same distinction be brought into the psychological vocabulary.
In our view, an entirely different form of analysis is fundamental. . . . This form of analysis relies on the partitioning of the complex whole into units. In contrast to the term 'element', the term 'unit' designates a product of analysis that possesses all the basic characteristics of the whole. The unit is a vital and irreducible part of the whole. . . . A psychology concerned with the study of the complex whole must comprehend this. It must replace the method of decomposing the whole into its elements with that of partitioning the whole into its units. Psychology must identify those units in which the characteristics of the whole are present, even though they may be manifested in altered form. Using this mode of analysis, it must attempt to resolve the concrete problems that face us. (Vygotsky, 1987: 46-7) The Russian editor of the original text points out that this contrast of unit and element was one of Vygotsky's favourite notions, first employed in The Psychology of Art. The significance of these paired terms is very similar to that of Husserl's discrimination of independent part (piece) and dependent part (moment) of a complex whole. It takes up the argument first posed by Ehrenfels in 'On Gestalt Qualities' (1890) but which Vygotsky reconceptualized in Husserlian terms. Ehrenfels' and Carl Stumpf's whole-part theory (which here must be distinguished from part-whole theory; see Smith, 1988: 25-32 ) constructed a different logic of parts and wholes due in some measure to Gestalt theorists' focus on the structures of perceptual content, at the expense of other dimensions of conscious experience. In the final chapter, Vygotsky rejects the two prevalent orientations in the PHENOMENOLOGICAL FACTORS 81 debate on thinking and speech: that speech is externalized thinking with sound; and that thinking is internalized speech without sound. Both these theoretical positions are the result of construing thought as an independent whole and a word as an independent whole and then attempting to account for their conjuncture as a relation of causal interaction. His realignment of the issue starts from the thesis that a verbal thought and a meaningful word are dependent parts (or moments) of a greater whole -there is a unity of word and thought. It is not pertinent to our concern here to rehearse Vygotsky's criticisms of these two approaches, nor is it within our expertise to evaluate Vygotsky's efforts to provide an account of the acquisition and development in the individual of verbal meaning. Rather, we shall focus on one of the central problems which he poses in the concluding chapter -'the need to clarify the functional role of verbal meaning in the act of thinking ' (1987: 249) . Perhaps we should state at the outset that Vygotsky introduces the core notion of 'inner speech' by taking as premises some of the basic distinctions in Husserl's theory of meaning from Investigation One, as well as Shpet's elaboration of von Humboldt's doctrine of the 'inner word'. However, in his attempts to marry these with his doctrine of the historical dimension of the psychological subject, he loses much of the intricate detail of Husserl's exposition and, perhaps as a result of this, runs into serious, irremediable problems. The relationship of thought and word 'is not a thing but a process, a movement from thought to word and from word to thought'. This movement, he says, is a developmental process: 'Thought is not expressed but completed in the word. We can therefore speak of the establishment (i.e. the unity of being and nonbeing) of thought in the word.' A thought strives to unify or establish a relation between one thing and another, though of course he does not endorse a relation of association between ideas of really existent things. Using a figure of speech with overtones from both Husserl and William James, Vygotsky states that thinking is an unfolding, a continuous flow, which is realized as an internal 'movement', that is, a unifying activity. The first task he sets himself is to analyze the phases that compose this movement, and this means to differentiate the planes which thought passes through as it becomes embodied in the word. Although 'phases' seem to be equated with 'planes' in this passage, perhaps we can take it that 'phases' are temporal moments linked together in founded relations, whereas 'planes' are levels which are discriminated by orders of complexity and which would be accessible to a static description.
The two planes of speech form a unity, a unity which in Husserl's terms comprises the two poles of the total psychical act: the inner, meaningful, semantic aspect of speech; and the external, auditory aspect. Vygotsky says that the 'movement' of basic units is differentiated according to which aspect is analyzed and that this is the consequence of the ontogenesis of speech HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 13 (3) 82 development. He hypothesizes that as the child masters the external aspect of speech, he or she moves from the part to the whole. But the child's first 'word' is not a one-word sentence but a whole phrase; thus, in terms of the meaningful, semantic aspect, the child begins with the whole and only later moves to the mastery of particular units, i.e. the meaning of separate words. The child 'only subsequently partitions its fused thought which is expressed in the one word sentence into a series of separate though interconnected verbal meanings' [emphasis added]. The development of the internal and the development of the external aspects of speech move in opposite directions: the semantic aspect develops from the whole to the part or from the sentence to the word; the external aspect from the part to the whole or from the word to the sentence (see Frawley, 1997: 91 ).
Vygotsky's highly condensed summary of his findings brings to the fore a number of early Husserlian terms from Investigations One and Four: part and whole, dependent and independent, partition and fusion, phases and layers in the constitution of meaning. Vygotsky's preferred motto that thought is completed in the word, when decomposed into the basic cognitive units, seems to be a transposition of Husserl's statement that some intentional acts are fulfilled and others unfulfilled. When Vygotsky discusses the laws which govern the ways in which basic units of the internal aspect are combined, he refers to this as 'a grammar of thought, a syntax of verbal meanings' (Vygotsky, 1987: 257) . One cannot help but be reminded of Husserl's detailed exposition of the dependent and independent parts of meaning in a pure grammar of thought. A careful examination of Vygotsky's remarks about the language of thought shows that he often remarked that words do not equal concepts but instead steer or orient towards them; words mediate and complete thinking but do not express it (Van der Veer and Valsinger, 1991: 265) . William Frawley synopsizes this notion by stating that speech is a language for thought, not a language of thought, but concludes that 'Vygotsky incorrectly believed that only verbal language works this way. We now know that higher thought can be accomplished by the internalization of any symbolic function' (Frawley, 1997: 95-6) .
Vygotsky isolates the key dimension which differentiates the external from the internal aspect of speech as 'inner speech' -which here must remain a term of art. External speech, he says, is a process of transforming thought into words; it is the materialization and objectivation of thought. In contrast, 'inner speech' moves in the reverse direction; it is 'the evaporation of speech in thought'. 'Inner speech' must be carefully distinguished from Piaget's notion of egocentric speech, the monologic comments which accompany a young child's activities when in the presence of other children. Vygotsky applauds Piaget's empirical studies but disagrees with Piaget's conclusion that a child's more mature thinking is the result of the atrophy of egocentric speech. Instead, it signals the emergence of a new form of speech, a dimension PHENOMENOLOGICAL FACTORS 83 of speech which is unique in its structure and function; it thus has an entirely different organization than external speech, that is, it has its own syntax (Vygotsky, 1987: 266 ).
Vygotsky's concluding statement is that 'inner speech is an internal plane of verbal thinking which mediates the dynamic relationship between thought and word' (ibid.: 279). His task then is to isolate those features of 'inner speech' which confer its unique syntactic status. One way to illustrate this thesis is to look closely at the process of abbreviation which takes place between written and oral speech, both forms of external speech; where oral speech conveys parts of expression through intonation, gesture, rhythm and so forth, written speech must be more explicit. The ordered arrangement of the written text hides a complex activity where expression has moved from a rough draft to a final draft. Reflection on one's written work allows one to clarify one's thought; 'inner speech' functions as an internal rough draft of one's pre-reflective thinking. Vygotsky's detailed analyses elicit these essential characteristics of 'inner speech': (1) the tendency towards predication; (2) the reduction in the phonetic aspect; (3) the predominance of sense over meaning; (4) the agglutination of semantic units; (5) the influence of word sense; and (6) idiomatic or private meaning. The analogy with the various drafts which cognitive processes pass through before issuing in a revised and corrected form in an overt expression, whether internal or external, may remind some readers of Daniel Dennett's recent statement about the Multiple Drafts Theory of Consciousness -but such a comparison is beyond the scope of this article.
THE PLANE OF 'INNER SPEECH' AND ITS COMPLICATIONS
It is simply not feasible to discuss all of the principal features which Vygotsky claims for 'inner speech'; instead we will focus our attention on sense versus meaning and the thesis of a private idiolect. He argues that 'the pure, absolute predicativity of "inner speech" is one of the most subtle and complex theses', it is 'fundamental to the resolution of all related issues', and is 'the basic and indeed the only form assumed in "inner speech" ' (1987: 273) -strong words indeed. Written speech is characterized by a complete absence of the 'dropped subject', i.e. its statements are maximally expanded, whereas oral speech occupies a middle position, i.e. its statements are sometimes expanded, sometimes not. But what could this possibly mean? Vygotsky goes on to claim that 'in inner speech, we always know what our [inner] speech is about; we always know our internal situation, the theme of our inner dialogue. . . . We always know our own expectations and intentions. . . . In inner speech, the predicate is always sufficient. The subject always remains in the HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 13 (3) 84 mind ' (ibid.: 273) . The reiteration of the term 'always' confers an absolute, invariant tone to his thesis about the predicativity of 'inner speech' which should trigger some alarm bells. It strikes me as quite obvious that we don't always know our own expectations and intentions, we don't always know our own 'internal situation' (whatever that means). In Husserl's terms, we are sometimes only minimally aware of our surroundings, our expectations, and our emotional state. Each of these can be emptily intended -the intention is fulfilled only where awareness focuses on an item in our environment, or a future state or what have you, and it is only through the process of reflection that one can become aware of the manner in which some intentions are fulfilled and others not. Perhaps the problem underlying Vygotsky's categorical statement resides with the term 'know' -Frawley places Vygotsky's model of thinking and speech in the context of current cognitive science and argues that some conscious processes take place only at the neuro-computational level which 'stores' information in the way the Soviet psychologist says a student doing a sum in maths 'retains' the remainder while moving through successive arithmetical steps (Frawley, 1997: 100-10) . This sort of process occurs at a lower level than conscious activity or knowledge strictly speaking, a level which itself must be discriminated from meta-consciousness, or reflection on one's knowledge, a further level which Vygotsky also explored.
Vygotsky's inference regarding the entirely predicative character of 'inner speech' rests on an analogy with an unusual, even uncommon, variety of oral speech, illustrations of which he unpacks from Russian writers. (Itself an odd source -for what is this but a written account of a fictional dialogue; but let us assume that such oral exchanges actually take place.) Lovers' intimate discourse sometimes betrays a highly abbreviated syntax, such that one word or even an initial letter can communicate a whole sentence or the train of thought expressed by a sentence. Vygotsky hypothesizes that this is possible due to 'shared apperception' or co-apperception between the two speakers. He then goes on to state that this shared apperception is complete and absolute in the 'social interaction' with oneself that takes place in 'inner speech'. But in a more straightforward fashion, we would more likely say that in the former case the persistence of shared beliefs, patterns of behaviour and previous conversations merely lowers the threshold which permits the mutual identification of the subject-matter of one's speech; whereas in the latter case there aren't two egos who share an apperception in some way.
Two further comments: first, it strikes me as stretching the point to claim that sharing tacit knowledge of a subject-matter with another person is similar to 'sharing' such knowledge with oneself. What mental function is the term 'sharing' meant to pick out? Unless of course one holds to a general picture of consciousness like Julian Jayne's thesis that a fully realized consciousness is the result of a breakdown of the 'bicameral mind', where one hemisphere 'speaks' to the other and is interpreted as an 'inner voice'. Second, perhaps it is merely an unfortunate choice of words, but to assert that predicative 'inner speech' arises through social interaction with (or in) oneself falsely transposes the type of interconnection between contiguous and successive things from the natural to the mental sphere -a lapse into the naïve attitude which Vygotsky himself cautions against. It may be possible to rescue an understanding of the absolute predicativity of 'inner speech' by interpreting this feature in terms of intentional content, but such a construal will have to be postponed until we have examined Husserl's theory of meaning.
In addition to the unique syntax of 'inner speech' and the absence of sound structure (which we will not discuss here), Vygotsky adduces a third distinctive characteristic, its semantic structure, i.e. the ordered arrangement of meanings. In order to elucidate this notion, he adopts from the French psychologist Frederick Paulhan the distinction between a word's sense and its meaning. 5 A word's sense is the aggregate of all the psychological facts which arise in consciousness as the result of hearing and using the word. 'Sense is a dynamic, fluid and complex formation which has several zones that vary in their stability. Meaning is only one of these zones of the sense that the word acquires in the context of speech. It is the most stable, unified and precise of these zones ' (1987: 276) . In contrast to meaning which has a comparatively fixed and stable point or centre, a word's sense changes according to different contexts. Paulhan's thesis may sound like the claim that a word's meaning is constant irrespective of circumstances, but Vygotsky goes on to assert that the actual meaning is 'inconstant' -'in one operation, the word emerges with one meaning; in another, another [meaning] is acquired.' Paulhan's problem was to account for the dynamic relation between sense and meaning; only in the lexicon does a word have a fixed meaning, which otherwise is 'nothing more than a potential which can only be realized in living speech, and in living speech, meaning is only a cornerstone in the edifice of sense'. This is a rather confusing account: first, because there seems to be a serious conflation between the psychological associations which a word acquires via a person's unique affective, volitional and moral experiences (on the one hand), with the philosophical or phenomenological concepts of 'meaning' and 'sense' (on the other); and second, because one wants to ask what is the 'stable point' which remains constant with all the changes in the word's sense -is this some 'core' meaning about which other meanings revolve? It is the ill-defined meaning of the concepts of 'sense' and 'meaning', and the relation between them, which leads Vygotsky, following Paulhan, to one of his most contentious conclusions -that a word's sense is unique and special for each person, and since a word acquires its sense only in the context of an entire language, the language of 'inner speech' is private and special for that person. His final statement on this issue subtly interchanges 'sense' with 'meaning', HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 13(3) 86 so that it reads: 'The meaning of the word in "inner speech" is an individual meaning, a meaning understandable only in the plane of "inner speech". It is as idiomatic as an elision or password' (ibid.: 279). Now it is one thing to claim that 'inner speech' is an entirely unique, independent function of a person's speech capacity, it is another thing to claim that the meanings of the units -and hence the whole lexicon -in 'inner speech' are themselves unique and independent of the meanings of words used in external speech. Insofar as Vygotsky holds to the former claim, he has to confront the intractable dilemma posed by Wittgenstein in his arguments in the Philosophical Investigations against a private language. Now that we have worked through some of Vygotsky's arguments about the relation of thinking and speech we can turn to Husserl's theory of meaning in Investigation One (see Simons, in Smith and Smith, 1995: 107-15) . He begins by clearly discriminating meanings as ideal entities of a peculiar kind from the mental acts which intend them, the mental states which accompany speakers' utterances, and finally from the objects or referents to which the speakers refer in using expressions. A written or spoken word is a sensible sign which always occurs in conjunction with certain mental acts, some of which are irrelevant to the expression's meaning. An utterance intimates to the hearer some facts about the mental acts of the speaker which are understood without the need for any other sign. This is the indicative aspect of an expression which should not be confused with its meaning. Thus when the cleaner says the clock is broken (Vygotsky's own example), she doesn't mean that she believes the clock is broken, but that the clock itself is broken, whereas what her statement intimates is that she believes the clock is broken. What the statement refers to is another thing, a state of affairs, namely the clock's being broken.
It is at this point in his exposition that Husserl introduces the psychological notion of 'interior monologue' or soliloquy. For Husserl, 'inner speech' indicates a decisive factor about human language understanding, namely that communication and intimation are the purpose of the expression of a word or a sentence; they are incidental, not essential to the meaning of a word or a sentence. In Husserl's words, what 'breathes life' into a written or spoken sign are the mental acts of the person who understands it. But these mental acts which intend this meaning are not themselves the meaning; thus the meaning is not something private or 'merely' subjective. The mental act of judging that the clock is broken is a transient experience which arises and passes away, but the meaning does not; it is the same meaning which anyone would intend under those circumstances. Expressions with different meanings can refer to the same object; thus, 'the victor at Jena' and 'the vanquished at Waterloo' have different meanings but refer to the same person, Napoleon. Moreover, two different expressions can have the same meaning and the same referent, e.g. 'two' and 'zwei'. A declarative sentence also has a referent, a state of affairs, and different sentence-meanings may refer to the same state of affairs, e.g. 'x is larger than y' and 'y is smaller than x'. Husserl's theory of meaning is very similar to Frege's sense and reference (sinn and bedeutung) which is almost certainly paralleled by Vygotsky's use of the Russian words smysl and znachenie (see Frawley, 1997: 28 ). We will not rehearse the long and intricate debate on the similarities and claims to priority in the Frege-Husserl account of sense and meaning. For our purposes here, we merely endorse the observation of several recent students of this issue, that many of Frege's and Husserl's novel insights are strikingly congruent. Peter Simons concludes that 'Husserl's linguistic intuition on this point was certainly more secure than Frege's. Husserl thus effects a remarkable economy in the ontology of abstract meaning by employing the relation of instantiation or exemplification, which the realist about universals needs anyway, and at the same time tying meaning internally to the mental, a feat which had eluded his Platonist forebears, Bolzano and Frege' (Simons in Smith and Smith, 1995: 112) -and here we might add, some of his descendants as well, including Vygotsky.
Vygotsky does indeed think of 'inner speech' as an internal, subjective language comprised entirely of predicates with elided or dropped 'subjects' because he modelled the relation between mental acts and 'inner speech' on the relation between the 'objects' of thought and external speech. The purely predicative domain of 'inner speech' is the entirety of meanings acquired through experience, education and socialization -'inner speech' predicates are the senses which meanings assume, or 'take upon' them 'like a garment'. Vygotsky's thesis about 'inner speech' mythologizes a curious psychological feature of human cognition, perhaps peculiar to human beings alone, that some of our thinking has the character of an 'inner voice' or an internal soliloquy. But to claim that it mediates between thinking and speech is to posit an unnecessary and mysterious third cognitive dimension. One might argue that Vygotsky's thesis internalizes a magical schema of causality and dependence, a schema observed amongst children and so-called 'primitive mentalities', and endows the mind with occult powers over its own private language.
Vygotsky returns to the Husserlian model of idealistic psychology in the chapter on 'The Crisis in Current Psychology' in which he summarizes the three dominant trends according to their answer to the question about what makes the most diverse phenomena into psychological facts: for traditional psychology it is mental properties; for reflexology or behaviourism it is observable behaviour; for Freudian psychoanalysis it is the unconscious. Each of these makes grand theoretical and methodological assumptions, employs its own technical vocabulary, and is incapable of accommodating the other two theories' principles without eliminating their core concept -no scientific psychology can result from the attempted unification or reconciliation of these two trends. Due to his Marxist-Socialist view of social-cultural HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 13(3) 88 I attach great importance to this distinction, I see it as the crown and center of the whole analysis, and at the same time for me it is now as obvious as a simple scale. Phenomenology (descriptive psychology) proceeds from a radical distinction between physical nature and mental being. In nature we distinguish phenomena in being, 'In other words, in the mental sphere there is no distinction between phenomenon and being, and while nature is existence which manifests itself in the phenomena', this cannot be asserted about mental being (Husserl) . Here phenomenon and being coincide. It is difficult to give a more precise formulation of psychological idealism. And this is the epistemological formula of psychological materialism: 'The difference between thinking and being has not been destroyed in psychology. Even concerning thinking one must distinguish the thinking of thinking and the thinking as such ' (Feuerbach) . The whole debate is in these two formulas. (ibid.: 322) Vygotsky extols another of Feuerbach's maxims as an exemplary expression of the deeply buried conundrum which underlies the dichotomy between the purely mental act of thought for me and the material, sensory content of thought in itself. He says that Stumpf and Pfander understood that 'a special science', neither physical science not psychical science (psychology), was needed to address this most basic issue about human consciousness, and further, that their answer was Husserl's phenomenology. 'Who will study what has been eliminated both times, this appearance? But the problem of appearance is an apparent problem. After all, in science we want to learn about the real and not the apparent cause of appearance. This means that we must take the phenomena as they exist independently from me' (ibid.: 324). The real cause of appearances, especially with regard to one's own mental contents, can be fruitfully addressed only if one already has a clear and welldefined insight into what constitutes the unique 'objectivity' of the 'objects' of thought; this is accessible only through an understanding of the essence of the phenomena precisely as appearances to a conscious being. 'In order to create such intermediate theories . . . we must reveal the essence of the given area of phenomena, the laws of their change, their qualitative and quantitative characteristics, their causality; we must create categories and concepts appropriate to it, in short, we must create our own Das Kapital ' (ibid.: 330) . In this passage, Vygotsky clearly endorses the phenomenological orientation toward a new science of essences; moreover, although his reference to Marx's great work signals his special ideological situation, it allows us to more succinctly state what he thought to be lacking in Husserl's approach, another dimension which would take into account the genesis and maturation of ideas during the course of an individual's life.
In conclusion, to gather together the many strands of this story, we can HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 13(3) 90
